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Is it “theoretically or practically possible for a
misdiagnosed condition to be properly stabilized”?1

ABSTRACT
With the U.S. elder population on the brink of booming, attention to
the ramifications of legal standards that affect them is a must. In 2018, the
Sixth Circuit split from its sister circuits and solidified an interpretation of
the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act’s (EMTALA)
“appropriate medical screening” standard that will adversely affect aging
individuals. Since older adults are the most likely demographic to use
emergency care services, laws that impact emergency care will inevitably
trickle down to this group of people. To protect already vulnerable older
adults, EMTALA should be modified in such a way that (1) it eliminates
interpretations such as the “improper motive” standard that the Sixth
Circuit enforces and (2) gross deviation from the standard of care will
constitute a “failure to provide appropriate medical screening”—and give
rise to a cause of action under EMTALA.
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1. Jack E. Karns, Hospital Screening Procedures and the Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act (EMTALA): Proof of “Improper Intent” Not Necessary in Failure to Stabilize Cases,
9 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 355, 366 (2000).

863

864

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 43:863

CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................. 863
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 864
I. MAJORITY RULE FOR EMTALA’S APPROPRIATE MEDICAL
SCREENING REQUIREMENT ................................................................... 866
II. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S “IMPROPER MOTIVE” STANDARD ................. 869
III. THE IMPACT OF THE “IMPROPER MOTIVE” ON THE AGING
POPULATION ......................................................................................... 872
A. The Silver Context ........................................................................ 872
B. Importance of Medical Screening
with Geriatric ED Patients ............................................................... 873
IV. STATUTORY REVISION TO EMTALA’S APPROPRIATE MEDICAL
SCREENING ............................................................................................ 876
A. Issues with EMTALA’s Broad Language ..................................... 876
B. Proposed Legislation for EMTALA’s
Appropriate Medical Screening........................................................ 877
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 880

INTRODUCTION
You arrive at the emergency room. Your neck has been causing you
problems and you have been experiencing dizziness, including “a spinning
sensation, difficulty sleeping, nausea, vomiting, and a headache that
worsen[s] with movement.”2 You have been seeing a chiropractor for the
last year and believe the visits led to your injuries.
It is finally your turn to see the ER doctor. Dr. Craig Reynolds treats
you and notes that your symptoms include high blood pressure, elevated
white blood cell count, the presence of red blood cells in urine, the
presence of a fever, and dizziness with a worsening headache. You receive
no further imaging, tests, or other diagnostic studies. Dr. Reynolds
prescribes you medicine and tells you to “take it easy.” Then, you are
discharged.
You learn later that your symptoms were consistent with vertebral
dissection, which is known to result from excessive chiropractic
manipulation of the neck. But Dr. Reynolds did not screen you for that
2. Elmhirst v. McLaren N. Mich. Hosp., No. 1:17-CV-00374, 2017 WL 4535714, at *1 (W.D.
Mich. July 19, 2017), aff’d, 726 F. App’x 439 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Elmhirst v.
McLaren N. Mich. Hosp., 139 S. Ct. 325 (2018).
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condition. Since your discharge, your symptoms have worsened. You have
a stroke, and you are back at the hospital four days later. This time, Dr.
Roger Gietzen, a neurologist, treats you.
Dr. Gietzen tells you that you suffered from a stroke caused by
vertebral dissection. Dr. Piyush Patel, an internist at the hospital, verifies
this assessment and identifies the chiropractic manipulation as a potential
underlying cause.3
You have no federal remedy—but you should.
Although Congress designed the Emergency Medical Treatment and
Labor Act (EMTALA or the Act) to be a nondiscriminatory statute4 for
emergency treatment5 rather than a federal medical malpractice statute,6
individuals should be allowed to bring a suit under EMTALA if their ER
screening is wildly deficient. Under EMTALA, hospitals have a duty to
appropriately screen and stabilize patients that enter the emergency
department—regardless of their ability to pay.7 EMTALA establishes a
private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(a).8 Within a
two-year statute of limitations,9 an individual may bring a civil action
against a Medicare-participating hospital (nearly 98% of hospitals fall into
this category)10 if he or she suffers as a direct result of that hospital.11
While hospitals can be held liable under EMTALA under five general
scenarios, this Comment will focus on one particular scenario: the failure
to appropriately screen a patient for an emergency medical condition that
is within the hospital’s capabilities to treat.12
The standard for “appropriate medical screening” in the Sixth Circuit
splits from the majority and moves in a harmful direction by requiring
3. The introduction derives facts from Elmhirst v. McLaren N. Mich. Hosp., 726 Fed. Appx. 439
(6th Cir. 2018).
4. Sai Balasubramanian, Examining the Impacts of Current Malpractice Frameworks and
EMTALA on Emergency Medicine, 41 NOVA L. REV. 181, 201 (2017).
5. Hadley Hamilton & Samuel D. Hodge, Jr., et al., A Look Behind the Closed Doors of the
Emergency Room - A Medical/Legal Perspective, 16 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 1, 3 (2011) (defining
“emergency treatment” as “a medical specialty that focuses on the rapid assessment and diagnosis of
acute illnesses and injuries followed by the stabilization and management of the patient”).
6. See Sara Rosenbaum, The Enduring Role of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act, 32 HEALTH AFF. 2075, 2078 (2013).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) (2018).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2) (2018).
9. EMTALA Fact Sheet, AM. COL. OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, https://www.acep.org/life-as-aphysician/ethics--legal/emtala/emtala-fact-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/FX4H-PQW9].
10. Balasubramanian, supra note 3, at 201.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2) (2018).
12. Michael J. Frank, Tailoring EMTALA to Better Protect the Indigent: The Supreme Court
Precludes One Method of Salvaging a Statute Gone Awry, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 195, 203–
04 (2000) (discussing other scenarios, including the failure to stabilize a patient before transferring,
the failure to appropriately transfer a patient, refusal to accept a transferred patient, and delay of
screening, stabilization, or transfer in order to inquire about a patient’s ability to pay).
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plaintiffs in an EMTALA claim to allege that a hospital acted with an
“improper motive” in the failure to appropriately screen them.13 Instead,
the standard should move to include some component of negligence.
Because of the rapidly aging population, elderly patients will be the largest
demographic who will be affected by the laws and remedies governing the
ER. Thus, to further protect the high volume of elderly patients who
especially need appropriate care, grossly deficient medical screening
should equate to the failure to screen under EMTALA and thus give rise
to a cause of action.
This Comment contains four parts. First, this Comment will explain
the majority rule regarding EMTALA’s “appropriate medical screening.”
Second, it will address the Sixth Circuit’s split from other circuits, which
is most recently demonstrated in Elmhirst v. McLaren Northern
Michigan.14 Third, it will illustrate the negative impact an “improper
motive” standard would have on the aging population. Fourth, it will
propose a statutory revision to EMTALA’s appropriate medical screening
prong.
I. MAJORITY RULE FOR EMTALA’S APPROPRIATE MEDICAL
SCREENING REQUIREMENT
Across federal courts, the majority rule for alleging inappropriate
medical screening reflects EMTALA’s purpose of nondiscrimination: the
requirement of uniform treatment.15 More specifically, a plaintiff must
allege (1) that he or she received a different examination than would have
been offered to other patients presenting similar symptoms and (2) as a
result of this disparate screening, the hospital failed to identify an
emergency medical condition and he suffered harm as result.16 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) delineates the screening requirement EMTALA
imposes, which requires hospitals to provide “appropriate medical
screening examination[s]” that are within the capability of the hospital’s
emergency department to treat.17
Circuits have been opposed to implementing a motive requirement
and have directly criticized the Sixth Circuit’s outlier interpretation and
reasonings for the “improper motive” component. More specifically, the
13. See generally Elmhirst v. McLaren N. Mich. Hosp., 726 Fed. Appx. 439 (6th Cir. 2018).
14. Id.
15. E.g., Summers v. Baptist Med. Ctr. Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132, 1138 (8th Cir. 1996).
16. See, e.g., Sanders v. Legacy, 676 F. App’x 709 (9th Cir. 2017); Power v. Arlington Hosp.
Ass’n, 42 F.3d 851, 856 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he plain language of [EMTALA] requires a hospital to
develop a screening procedure designed to identify such critical conditions that exist in symptomatic
patients and to apply that screening procedure uniformly to all patients with similar complaints.”)
(quoting Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 879 (1992)).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2018).
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D.C. Circuit, First Circuit, Eighth Circuit, Tenth Circuit, and Fourth
Circuit conflict with the Sixth Circuit.
The D.C. Circuit regards the motive for inappropriate screening as
unimportant. In Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., the court
abided by the majority rule and evaluated whether the screening the
plaintiff received was a departure from the treatment that a similarly
situated patient would receive.18 The court expressly stated that “any
departure from standard screening procedures constitutes inappropriate
screening” and further noted that “[t]he motive for such departure is not
important.”19
Moreover, the First Circuit in Correa v. Hospital San Francisco
reiterated the same idea. The court here laid out the majority rule that
“[t]he essence of [EMTALA’s screening] requirement is that there be
some screening procedure, and that it be administered even-handedly,”20
and outwardly rejected any motive requirement by stating that “regardless
of motive, a complete failure to attend a patient who presents a condition
that practically everyone knows may indicate an immediate and acute
threat to life can constitute a denial of an appropriate medical screening
examination under section 1395dd(a).”21
A particularly direct critique of the Sixth Circuit’s “improper
motive” is from the Eighth Circuit. In Summers v. Baptist Medical Center
Arkadelphia, the Eighth Circuit stated, “[w]e cannot agree [with the Sixth
Circuit] that . . . evidence of improper motivation is essential.”22 Further,
the court demonstrated that the statute does not require any type of
motivation and concluded that the statute imposes a strict-liability
standard—that is, the hospital is liable if it fails to provide appropriate
medical screening, regardless of what the motivation was for the failure.23
Thus, in the Eighth Circuit (like many others), a plaintiff need not
demonstrate any level of intent on the part of the hospital; rather, the
plaintiff must show only that the hospital failed to provide an appropriate
medical screening examination in accordance with the majority uniform
treatment rule.24
The Tenth Circuit also demonstrates distaste for the “improper
motive” requirement and has firmly stated that no motive is attached to
EMTALA liability.25 In Phillips v. Hillcrest Medical Center, Phillips went
18. Gatewood v. Wash. Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
19. Id.
20. Correa v. Hosp. S. F., 69 F.3d 1184, 1192 (1st Cir. 1995).
21. Id. at 1193.
22. Summers v. Baptist Med. Ctr. Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132, 1138 (8th Cir. 1996).
23. Id. at 1137–38
24. Id. at 1143.
25. See Phillips v. Hillcrest Med. Ctr., 244 F.3d 790, 798 (10th Cir. 2001).

868

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 43:863

to the ER and complained of severe chest pain and pneumonia-like
symptoms.26 After his examination, the physicians gave him two
prescription medications and discharged him.27 A few days later, his father
brought him to a different ER.28 The doctors at this ER confirmed that
Phillips was suffering from bacterial endocarditis, and he died a few days
later as a result of the infection.29
Although the court held that no EMTALA claim existed due to the
lack of evidence that the ER deviated from EMTALA’s uniform treatment
requirement, the court stated, “This circuit, like many others, does not
require any particular motive for EMTALA liability to
attach[;] . . . EMTALA looks only at the participating hospital’s actions,
not motives.”30 Like the Eighth Circuit in Summers, the Tenth Circuit
interprets EMTALA as imposing a strict-liability standard.31
Finally, the Fourth Circuit directly rejects the improper motive. In
Power v. Arlington Hospital Association, a patient came into the ER
because she was suffering from pain in her left hip, her lower left
abdomen, and her back running down her leg; she also was experiencing
shaking, difficulty walking, and severe chills.32 Most importantly, she had
a sizeable boil that was visible on her cheek.33 The emergency nurses and
physicians did not note the boil on their records during her first visit and
merely prescribed her pain medication.34 The only diagnostic test the
doctors administered was a urine test before discharging her.35 When she
returned to the emergency room the next day, she was diagnosed with
suffering from septic shock and was admitted into the intensive care unit.36
She remained in the intensive care unit for four months and during that
time she had been on life support, had both legs amputated, lost eyesight,
and suffered severe and permanent lung damage.37 According to a medical
expert, if she had received appropriate medical screening (including a
blood test) upon her first visit, then her infection would likely have been
detected and properly treated.38

26. Id. at 794.
27. Id. at 794–95.
28. Id. at 795.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 798.
31. See id.
32. Power v. Arlington Hosp. Ass’n, 42 F.3d 851, 853 (4th Cir. 1994).
33. Id. at 854.
34. Id. at 854–55.
35. Id. at 855.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 855–56.
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The Fourth Circuit held that a jury could conclude that the care given
to Power deviated from that given to other similar patients.39 Moreover,
the Power court rejected Arlington Hospital Association’s argument—
which cites Cleland v. Bronson Healthcare Group, Inc. in the Sixth
Circuit—that the plaintiff had to prove the existence of an improper motive
on the part of the hospital in its failure to appropriately screen.40 The court
reasoned that (1) nothing in the statute itself requires an improper motive
on the part of the hospital as a prerequisite to recovery; (2) the motive
requirement is much too expansive; and (3) the issue with proving the
existence of an improper motive.41 Further, the court concluded that
“having to prove the existence of an improper motive . . . would make a
civil EMTALA claim virtually impossible,” naming this issue as “the most
fundamental problem with the motive requirement.”42
II. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S “IMPROPER MOTIVE” STANDARD
The story in the introduction is derived from the facts of Elmhirst v.
Northern Michigan,43 but the court in Elmhirst directly applied precedent.
More specifically, the court relied entirely on Cleland v. Bronson Health
Care Group, Inc., which was decided in the early 1990s.44
In Cleland, the plaintiffs took their teenage son, who was
complaining of cramps and vomiting, to the ER.45 The doctors diagnosed
him with influenza and discharged the teen four hours later.46 However,
the doctors’ diagnosis was incorrect; the teen was suffering from
intussusception, a condition that occurs when a part of the intestine
telescopes within itself.47 In less than twenty-four hours, he suffered from
cardiac arrest and died.48
The court held that the plaintiffs failed to allege a claim under
EMTALA regarding to the hospital’s failure to appropriately screen.49 The
court reasoned that in addition to not alleging a departure screening,50 they
failed to allege a motive.51 The court interpreted “appropriate”

39. Id. at 856.
40. Id. at 857.
41. Id. at 857–58.
42. Id. at 858.
43. Elmhirst v. McLaren N. Mich., 726 F. App’x 439 (6th Cir. 2018).
44. Id.; see Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Grp., Inc., 917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990).
45. Id. at 268.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 269.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 272.
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in § 1395dd(a) to “refer to the motives with which the hospital acts.”52
Furthermore, the court in Cleland suggested that indigency, lack of
insurance, race, sex, ethnic group, politics, occupation, education,
personal prejudice, drunkenness, and spite are all possible improper
motives resulting in the hospital’s liability under EMTALA.53
The Supreme Court overruled the “improper motive” standard for the
stabilization duty in Cleland in Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc.54 In
Roberts, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected its use because there was
no such implication in the text of EMTALA.55 The court found “no support
for such a [motive] requirement in the text of the statute.”56 The Supreme
Court in this case also noted the “appropriate medical screening” circuit
split:
The question of the correctness of the Cleland court’s reading
of § 1395dd(a)’s “appropriate medical screening” requirement is not
before us, and we express no opinion on it here. But there is no
question that the text of § 1395dd(b) does not require an
“appropriate” stabilization, nor can it reasonably be read to require
an improper motive.
This fact is conceded by respondent, which notes in its brief that
“the ‘motive’ test adopted by the court below . . . lacks support in any
of the traditional sources of statutory construction.”57

When Elmhirst appealed the dismissal of her EMTALA claim, the
appellate court applied the de novo standard of review.58 The Sixth Circuit
found that the district court properly dismissed her complaint for failing to
allege an improper motive and directly applied Cleland.59 But as
mentioned in Power, the court creates an impossible burden of proof for a
plaintiff to meet. Moreover, the court in Elmhirst justified its interpretation
in an effort to distinguish a cause of action under EMTALA’s § 1395dd(a)
from state-law medical malpractice claims.60 Although the Supreme Court
denied Elmhirst’s petition for certiorari,61 a circuit split still exists—and
Elmhirst pushes the interpretation of “appropriate” in the wrong direction.

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Roberts v. Galen of Va., Inc., 525 U.S. 249, 250 (1999).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 253.
58. Elmhirst v. McLaren N. Mich., 726 F. App’x 439, 441 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. denied 139 S.
Ct. 325 (2018).
59. Id. at 440–41.
60. Id. at 442.
61. Elmhirst v. McLaren N. Mich. Hosp., 139 S. Ct. 325 (2018).
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The modernization of EMTALA can work to improve the quality of
emergency care.62 Outside commenters agree that an “improper motive”
requirement should not be necessary for an EMTALA cause of action, and
legislation revisions to make EMTALA more effective is the best route.63
Jack Karns particularly showed disappointment in the Sixth Circuit’s
decision to derive an “improper motive” retirement:
With all due respect to the Sixth Circuit, this is not the point of
EMTALA. The Act is designed to protect patients who are critically
injured by allowing hospitals to have screening and transfer decision
procedures applied on a uniform basis. The scenario suggested by
consideration of a proper or improper motive is not relevant in
rendering an opinion for a case properly brought under EMTALA.
The Sixth Circuit’s claim that the Cleland [sic] decision, if decided
in any other manner, would effectively allow EMTALA to become a
federal remedy for medical malpractice, is an overstatement because
the statutory boundaries were clearly delineated in both the Act and
by those who sponsored the legislation.64

Karns went on to make an incredible point: “Accordingly,” he states,
“the court pointed out that EMTALA does not require doctors to conduct
an appropriate medical screening in order to render a correct diagnosis, but
rather that ‘they are charged with the duty [to] stabiliz[e] a patient’s
condition as’ presented to them.”65 He then closed his idea by saying,
“This statement raises the rather interesting question as to whether it is
theoretically or practically possible for a misdiagnosed condition to be
properly stabilized.”66
The improper motive requirement is not a good one, and even courts
within the Sixth Circuit do not uniformly agree with it. In Burd v. Lebanon
HMA, the court criticized but followed the Sixth Circuit’s unique improper
motive requirement and granted the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment based on the plaintiff’s failure to provide evidence of such
motive.67

62. See generally Katharine Van Tassel, Modernizing the Emergency Medical Treatment &
Labor Act to Harmonize with the Affordable Care Act to Improve Equality, Quality and Cost of
Emergency Care, 15 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 131 (2015).
63. See Judith L. Dobbertin, Eliminating Patient Dumping: A Proposal for Model Legislation,
28 VAL. U. L. REV. 291, 334–35 (1993). See generally Danielle Sapega, Federal Code Blue: The
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act’s Prolonged Venture into Malpractice Law, 29
TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 99 (2010).
64. Karns, supra note 1, at 365–66.
65. Id. at 366 (citing Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Grp., Inc., 917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990)).
66. Id.
67. See Burd v. Lebanon HMA, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902–06 (M.D. Tenn. 2010).
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III. THE IMPACT OF THE “IMPROPER MOTIVE” ON THE AGING
POPULATION
The federal standard for appropriate medical screening should not
include a motive requirement. First, demographics are evolving; the
emergency department (ED) in particular is rapidly graying.68 Second, the
medical screenings that older adults receive in an ED are extremely critical
to their life expectancy and quality of life following a visit.69 Ultimately,
requiring an improper motive would negatively impact an already
vulnerable population by creating unnecessary obstacles to remedies.
A. The Silver Context
The Silver Tsunami will inevitably flood emergency departments
across the country with 10,000 baby boomers turning sixty-five years old
each day.70 The “Baby Boom” refers to births from 1946 to 1964 and has
yet to show its full impact.71 During this period, which was post-World
War II, approximately seventy-five million Americans were born.72
Moreover, the population of older adults is expected to increase: the
percentage of Americans sixty-five years or older was 13% in 2010 and is
projected to be more than 20% by 2030.73
Accordingly, “people ages sixty-five and older are the most likely to
visit U.S. emergency departments”74 and disproportionately use more
emergency services than any other age group.75 “Over 60 percent of
hospital admissions for patients over the age of 65 come through the
emergency department.”76 However, some programs focus on improving

68. See As Baby Boomers Age, Projections Show an Increase in ED Visits and Subsequent
Hospitalizations,
WEST
HEALTH,
https://www.westhealth.org/resource/baby-boomers-ageprojections-show-increase-ed-visits-subsequent-hospitalizations/ [https://perma.cc/EJ3T-NFWD].
69. See infra Section III(B).
70. Lisa Esposito, What Is a Geriatric Emergency Department?, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 28, 2018),
https://health.usnews.com/health-care/patient-advice/articles/2018-09-28/what-is-a-geriatricemergency-department [https://perma.cc/79MM-FCBJ].
71. Eric Berger, The Graying of America: The Impact of Aging Baby Boomers on Emergency
Departments, 51 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 288, 288 (2008).
72. Sondra Williamson, Serving an Aging Population in a Changing Health Care Landscape,
TEX. HOSP. ASS’N, May–June 2017, at 18.
73. JENNIFER M. ORTMAN, VICTORIA A. VELKOFF & HOWARD HOGAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
AN AGING NATION: THE OLDER POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 2–3 (2014).
74. Esposito, supra note 70.
75. Mark McClelland & Jeanne M. Sorrell, Enhancing Care of Older Adults in the Emergency
Department: Old Problems and New Solutions, 53 J. PSYCHOL. NURSING & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS.
18, 18–19 (2015).
76. Esposito, supra note 70.
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ED care for older patients, which may help to reduce the chance of hospital
admissions.77
Nonetheless, the emergency medicine system is at risk. The
increasing volume of older patients will place a “huge demand on the
entire health care system.”78 According to Mr. Zia Agha, Chief Medical
Officer at West Health Institute in San Diego, older adults in the ED must
have all their needs thoroughly assessed, including medical and social
problems.79 “When the bulk of your patients are elderly, it’s just a lot more
time consuming,” said Lynne Grief, who holds a Ph.D. in Nursing and
directs Emergency Services at Sarasota Memorial Healthcare System in
Sarasota, Florida.80 “It’s definitely much more labor intensive.”81
Thus, tending to more elderly patients in emergency departments can
mean less productivity for hospital staff; older individuals require more
attention and their presenting symptoms are often not as straightforward
compared to younger patients.82 Overall, older patients usually need to
have more diagnostic testing to attain effective answers.83 In addition,
communication in the ED can often be difficult due to the high prevalence
of cognitive impairment of elderly patients.84
B. Importance of Medical Screening with Geriatric ED Patients
Emergency Departments must adjust as baby boomers reach a
geriatric status.85 Older adults, unsurprisingly, are vulnerable patients, and
approximately 25% of older adults discharged from the ED return to

77. HIA Guest Blog, Older Adult-Friendly Emergency Department Staff Help Reduce Hospital
Admissions, J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC’Y (Jan. 11, 2018), http://www.healthinaging.org/blog/older-adultfriendly-emergency-department-staff-help-reduce-hospital-admissions/
[https://perma.cc/V7FTWSPN].
78. Berger, supra note 71, at 289.
79. Making Emergency Rooms Geriatric-Friendly, STRAITS TIMES (Dec. 17, 2018),
https://www.straitstimes.com/lifestyle/making-emergency-rooms-geriatric-friendly
[https://
perma.cc/MGV6-GRH8].
80. Berger, supra 71, at 289.
81. Id.
82. Tracy Hampton, Experts Predict Visits by Baby Boomers Will Soon Strain Emergency
Departments, 299 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2613, 2614 (2008). According to Dr. Bitondo Dyer, director of
the Geriatric Medicine Division at the University of Texas Medical School in Houston, “Older people
don’t present with diseases in the same ways that we’re taught in medical school.” Id. “For example,
compared with their younger counterparts, older patients with pneumonia are less likely to have the
typical hallmarks of fever and elevated white blood cell counts, and those with myocardial infarction
are less likely to have chest pain.” Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See generally Joan Somes & Nancy Stephens Donatelli, Retrofitting an Emergency
Department to Make It Geriatric Friendly, 43 J. EMERGENCY NURSING 472, 472–74 (2017).
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hospitals within thirty days.86 Moreover, older adults will be the most
heavily impacted group of people under EMTALA as a matter of numbers.
For the geriatric population, the ED has a unique position in playing
a role in improving care.87 Essentially, the ED is an “ever-increasing
access point for medical care,” and it is placed at a crossroads between
inpatient and outpatient care.88 The ED is essential. It “sets the stage” for
subsequent care because it is the initial site of care for both inpatient and
outpatient events.89 Screening in the ED is critical; more accurate
diagnoses can make the following care for older patients much more
effective.90
The average ED geriatric patient stay is 20% longer than younger
populations and uses 50% more lab and imaging services.91 In addition,
geriatric ED patients are 400% more likely to require social services, and
geriatric patients frequently leave the ED dissatisfied.92 “[O]ptimal
outcomes are not consistently attained.”93 These outcomes could be due to
the possibility that the modern emergency care management model is not
a fit for geriatric adults.94 Overall, effective and reliable emergency
medicine methods to improve post-ED geriatric outcomes face a number
of challenges.95
Older adults should receive proper, “appropriate” screening, but the
daily ED crowding makes effective screening difficult for all
populations.96 The most common priorities older ED patients raised were
related to the accuracy and efficiency of the medical evaluation.97 These
priorities should be considered by those attempting to improve the
emergency care of older adults.98 Thus, the medical screening duty a
hospital possesses is crucial as EDs are an important safety net and have a
significant role in maintaining the health and safety of older adults.99
86. Ula Hwang et al., Transforming Emergency Care for Older Adults, 32 HEALTH AFF. 2116,
2119 (2013).
87. Mark S. Rosenburg et al., Am. Coll. Emergency Physicians, Geriatric Emergency
Department Guidelines, 63 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. e7, e7 (2014).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. Among a sample of cognitively intact older ED patients.
98. See generally Katherine M. Hunold et al., Priorities of Care Among Older Adults in the
Emergency Department: A Cross-Sectional Study, 23 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 362 (2016).
99. Christopher R. Carpenter et al., High Yield Research Opportunities in Geriatric Emergency
Medicine: Prehospital Care, Delirium, Adverse Drug Events, and Falls, 66 A. J. GERONTOLOGY 775,
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The Geriatric Task Force, which proposes guidelines for geriatric
care, also finds screening to be specifically essential. In particular, when
screening older adults, health care professionals must be especially
cognizant of delirium.100 “Delirium is an emergency medical condition
that is associated with an increased risk of morbidity and mortality,” and
patients who are discharged from the ED with delirium are nearly three
times more likely to die within three months—compared to those whom
emergency physicians identify with delirium.101
Approximately 1 in 10 older ED patients suffer from delirium.102
However, emergency physicians recognize only a minority (16%–38%) as
impaired.103 Despite the continuing evidence supporting this finding, very
little has changed.104 “Older ED patients with delirium are still highly
prevalent, poorly recognized, and frequently are discharged to home with
inadequate planning and support.”105
In addition to screening for delirium, emergency department tools
exist for screening older adults to determine if they are at risk for falls106
or elder abuse107—all of which reinforce the importance of screening in
the ED. Grossly inadequate screening should not be deemed as
“appropriate” screening under EMTALA; it should count as the failure to
screen. Further, plaintiffs should not have to prove a hospital’s improper
motive because it has the same harmful effect as “patient dumping,” which
is what Congress intended to prevent with EMTALA.108

775 (2011) (“An ED visit by an older person often indicates heightened vulnerability to adverse
outcomes (e.g., cognitive/functional decline, death).”).
100. Tamara G. Fong, Samir R. Tulebaev & Sharon K. Inouye, Delirium in Elderly: Diagnosis,
Prevention and Treatment, NCBI (Mar. 29, 2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC3065676/ [https://perma.cc/EEV6-L4MA] (“Delirium is a common clinical syndrome
characterized by inattention and acute cognitive dysfunction.”).
101. Carpenter et al., supra note 99, at 777.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See generally Roberta A. Newton et al., An Emergency Department Screen to Identify Older
Adults At-Risk for Falls, J. GERONTOLOGY & GERIATRIC RES. (Sept. 19, 2012), https://www.omics
online.org/open-access/an-emergency-department-screen-to-identify-older-adults-at-risk-for-falls2167-7182.S1-002.php?aid=8953 [https://perma.cc/2Y3Q-4ZCF] (discussing fall statistics and
relation to injury/death).
107. See Tony Rosen et al., Recognizing and Managing Elder Abuse in the Emergency
Department, 49 EMERGENCY MED. 200, 200–07 (2017); see also Elder Abuse and the Role of
Emergency Medical Services EMS, GERIPAL (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.geripal.org/2018/04/elderabuse-and-EMS.html [https://perma.cc/3LB6-P2ED].
108. “Patient dumping” is the practice of denying medical care due to a person’s status as being
uninsured or lacking the ability to pay. See Tony Abraham, Patient Dumping a Symptom of Health
System Woes, HEALTHCARE DIVE (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/patientdumping-symptom-of-health-system-woes/516018/ [https://perma.cc/56B9-HZP3].
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IV. STATUTORY REVISION TO EMTALA’S APPROPRIATE MEDICAL
SCREENING
The current EMTALA provision regarding “appropriate medical
screening” has issues with its broad and ambiguous language.109 The
standard for “appropriate medical screening” should move toward
including some component of negligence in defining the term
“appropriate.” Ideally, a statutory revision would consider a grossly
deficient medical screening “not appropriate” and be deemed a “failure to
screen” under the EMTALA. In addition, this revision would expressly
eliminate any need for a plaintiff to prove the defendant’s motive and
focus on the defendant’s actions.
A. Issues with EMTALA’s Broad Language
Shortly after Congress passed EMTALA, some physicians predicted
that its effectiveness would be crippled by its vague definitions of
“emergency care” and “stabilizationer.”110 While the physicians may have
had other consequences in mind, they were right about one thing: the
vagueness in the statute would create issues. However, courts have
consistently been opposed to expanding EMTALA.111 Nonetheless,
EMTALA does not define the phrase “appropriate medical screening
examination” beyond stating that its purpose is to identify the “emergency
medical condition”112 that has to be stabilized.113 It does not define what it
is and, maybe even more importantly, what it is not.
A recent commenter, Henna K. Pithia, expressed that the lack of a
universally accepted definition for EMTALA’s “appropriate medical
screening” is problematic because the way a court chooses to interpret it

109. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2018).
110. Id.; see also Frank, supra note 12, at 232 (arguing that “EMTALA’s overbreadth may
ultimately produce effects that are at odds with the goals that Congress hoped to attain in enacting this
statute” and the “obvious problem is with the variety of judicial interpretations (most of which enjoy
some plausibility) caused by the vagueness and overbreadth of the statute”); Mark J. Garwin, Immunity
in the Absence of Charity: EMTALA and the Eleventh Amendment, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 5–6 (1998)
(“This variance in the courts’ rulings is a direct corollary of the failure of the statute’s language to
accurately reflect the legislative intent behind its enactment.”).
111. Stephanie B. Livesay, The New EMTALA Regulations: The Wrong Prescription for
Emergency Department Congestion, 3 APPALACHIAN J.L. 139, 155–156 (2004).
112. “Emergency medical condition” is defined as the following:
[M]anifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such
that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in—
(i) the placing of the health of the individual . . . in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious impairment
to bodily functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part[.]
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e) (2011).
113. Power v. Arlington Hosp. Ass’n, 42 F.3d 851, 856 (4th Cir. 1994).
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will determine whether or not an emergency medical condition exists.114
She finds it critical that “these terms be defined more precisely and
consistently.”115
State and federal courts are quite divided on how to apply EMTALA
and “tug[] at the meaning of each provision.”116 Although all the courts
appear to agree that EMTALA does not create a federal medical
malpractice claim, one court has described “an uneasy intersection
between EMTALA and state law medical negligence claims.”117
Another commenter, George P. Smith (a professor of law at the
Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C.118), has also
expressed disagreement with EMTALA’s overly vague language119:
It has been suggested that EMTALA is ineffective because it has
definitional flaws and enforcement shortcomings. Specifically,
because the statute’s key words are either defined vaguely or not
defined at all, courts juggle testimonies of medical experts and extract
their own definitions. Oftentimes, the legislative history of EMTALA
has been of value to judicial decisionmaking. . . . Judicial
constructions of EMTALA’s language remain problematic because
the courts must interpret the statute’s undefined terms and also apply
those terms to a particular hospital’s practice.120

The overly broad language gives too much room for interpretation
and ultimately can lead to harmful interpretations—such as requiring a
plaintiff to allege an improper motive for the failure to appropriately
screen in the emergency department.
B. Proposed Legislation for EMTALA’s Appropriate Medical Screening
EMTALA should be looked at from a public health perspective in
addition to case-by-case scenarios.121 Public health looks at population
health rather than just individual well-being.122 “Appropriate medical
114. Henna K. Pithia, Patient Dumping: The Cobra That Never Struck, 24 S. CAL. REV. L. &
SOC. JUST. 109, 121–22 (2014).
115. Id. at 122.
116. Charlotte A. Hoffman, EMTALA in the 21st Century: The Cornerstone of Care for
Uninsured and Underinsured, 47 NO. 11 DRI FOR DEF. 34 (2005) (quoting Phillips v. Hillcrest Med.
Ctr., 244 F.3d 790, 798 (10th Cir. 2001)).
117. Id.
118. George P. Smith, II, THE CATH. U. OF AM., https://www.law.edu/about-us/faculty-andstaff/directory/expert-faculty/smith-george-p/index.html [https://perma.cc/PCS9-3UQX].
119. George P. Smith, II, The Elderly and Patient Dumping, 73 FLA. B. J. 85, 86 (1999).
120. Id.
121. See generally Sara Rosenbaum & Brian Kamoie, Finding a Way through the Hospital Door:
The Role of EMTALA in Public Health Emergencies, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 590 (2003).
122. What Is Public Health?, CDC FOUND., https://www.cdcfoundation.org/what-publichealth [https://perma.cc/F6YL-BUQ5].
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screening” in EMTALA is just a piece of the puzzle; what EMTALA
should be accomplishing for the public is the picture the puzzle creates.
But the screening piece should be used to better protect the aging
populations. James Bentley (a Senior Vice President of the American
Hospital Association) writes, “[EMTALA] has a bias of caring [for] the
individual over the community[.]”123 Furthermore, Marlene Cimons (a
health policy and science journalist124) applies this same idea to the aging
ED population:
[M]any emergency departments, while effective in dealing with acute
problems, don’t always look at the big picture when it comes to older
patients. This means comprehensive screening procedures to check
all medications and health history, as well as conditions at home, with
the aim of not having to admit them to the hospital.125

The vagueness in the statute hurts plaintiffs the most. The ambiguity
in the phrase “appropriate medical screening examination” has created
significant judicial confusion.126 Even the court in Cleland declared the
word “appropriate” to be “one of the most wonderful weasel words in the
dictionary, and a great aid to the resolution of disputed issues in the
drafting of legislation.”127 Interpreting “appropriate” to contain a motive
on the part of the hospital creates a barrier which impedes on caring for
older adults needs—which will eventually be the dominating
population.128
If the “improper motive” expands, elderly patients will be
significantly affected by the improper motive requirement as they are
likely plaintiffs. However, EMTALA does not sufficiently protect elderly
patients from being a victim of patient dumping.129 Patient dumping and
access to health care are already prominent issues for older adults since

123. Rosenbaum & Kamoie, supra note 121, at 594 (quoting James Bentley, Senior Vice
President, Am. Hosp. Ass’n, Remarks to the Second National Symposium on Medical & Public Health
Response to Bioterrorism (Nov. 28, 2000)).
124. Marlene Cimons, MUCK RUCK, https://muckrack.com/marlene-cimons [https://perma.cc/
493G-XTU4].
125. Marlene Cimons, ERs Can Be Loud, Hectic and Even Dangerous for the Elderly. Here’s
How Hospitals Are Trying to Fix That, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/ers-can-be-loud-hectic-and-even-dangero
us-for-the-elderly-heres-how-hospitals-are-trying-to-fix-that/2018/12/07/9f242400-f362-11e8-80d0f7e1948d55f4_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f9902318aab8
[https://perma.cc/XP4D-NA
S5].
126. Nathan S. Richards, Judicial Resolution of EMTALA Screening Claims at Summary
Judgment, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 590, 603 (2012).
127. Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Grp., Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 271 (6th Cir. 1990).
128. See Rosenbaum & Kamoie, supra note 121.
129. Smith, supra note 118, at 86.
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they are not usually economically productive.130 Generally, the elderly
population is disproportionately impoverished as well as economically
disadvantaged.131 Thus, to better protect the elderly and to strengthen
EMTALA’s effectiveness—and to resolve the circuit split—Congress
should clarify some of the statute’s definitions.132
Some courts claim that EMTALA “is not a federal malpractice
statute and it does not set a national emergency health care standard;
claims of misdiagnosis or inadequate treatment are left to the state
malpractice arena.”133 Further, screening can satisfy EMTALA even if
there is a misdiagnosis.134 However, that does not mean there should be a
near-impossible standard for plaintiffs to meet.
While some proposals for “appropriate screening” move toward
eliminating overlap between medical malpractice and EMTALA
screening,135 this Comment proposes statutory language that would further
overlap the two. Nevertheless, Beverly Cohen puts forward a worthy goal:
“[T]o place control of enforcement back into the hands of the private
individuals who were wronged in the first place.”136 A statutory revision
to § 1395dd(a) should expand the statute to include §§ 1395dd(a)(1)
and 1395dd(a)(2) and read as follows:
In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency department, if
any individual (whether or not eligible for benefits under this
subchapter) comes to the emergency department and a request is
made on the individual’s behalf for examination or treatment for a
medical condition, the hospital must provide for an appropriate
medical screening examination within the capability of the hospital’s
emergency department, including ancillary services routinely
available to the emergency department, to determine whether or not
an emergency medical condition (within the meaning of subsection
(e)(1)) exists.

130. Id. at 87.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 86.
133. E.g., Summers v. Baptist Med. Ctr. Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132, 1137 (8th Cir. 1996); see
also Del Carmen Guadalupe v. Negron Agosto, 299 F.3d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 2002).
134. See generally Hemanth Gundavaram, EMTALA: Screening Can Satisfy EMTALA, Despite
Misdiagnosis, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 169, 170 (2003).
135. See Beverly Cohen, Disentangling EMTALA from Medical Malpractice: Revising
EMTALA’s Screening Standard to Differentiate between Ordinary Negligence and Discriminatory
Denials of Care, 82 TUL. L. REV. 645, 683 (2007).
136. Lawrence Bluestone, Straddling the Line of Medical Malpractice: Why There Should Be a
Private Cause of Action against Physicians via EMTALA, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2829, 2864 (2007).
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1) “Appropriate” shall not be read to require an individual to prove
an intent or any type of motivation on the part of the hospital. The
standard shall be construed as a strict-liability provision.
2) A hospital’s gross deviation from the standard of care or grossly
deficient screening shall be considered a failure to provide an
appropriate medical screening.

This language eliminates the possibility of a court interpreting an
improper motive from an “appropriate medical screening” and allows the
patient the fair opportunity to bring a case under EMTALA when he or
she has received grossly deficient medical screening. This interpretation is
a higher standard than ordinary professional negligence,137 yet provides a
great protection for patients—and a greater protection for geriatric patients
whose lives depend on effective screening.
The text of the appropriate screening requirement, like the
“stabilization” requirement as the Supreme Court pointed out in Roberts,
does not strongly implicate an improper motive.138 Even under the
majority standard, plaintiffs have difficulty achieving a case.139 But the
Sixth Circuit adds an extra barrier, which is unnecessary and even renders
the private right of action useless to most injured plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
The statutory revision provided in this Comment would better
achieve Congress’s goal to prevent a type of “patient dumping.” While
some commentators express concern of excessive litigation140 or view the
rationale for the improper motive requirement as “[o]ne way of limiting
the potentially sweeping scope of the statute’s language[,] . . .”141 effective
patient dumping prevention is important. In the modern context, the Sixth
Circuit’s interpretation makes inadequate and grossly deficient screening
of an elderly person “appropriate,” forcing plaintiffs to prove a hospital’s
improper motive in its failure to screen, a near-impossible standard to
meet, has the same effect as kicking patients to the curb.142

137. E.g., Hardy v. Marsh, 170 S.W.3d 865 (Tex. App. 2005) (citations omitted) (“The standard
of care for a doctor is what a reasonable and prudent doctor would have done under the same or similar
circumstances. Identifying the standard of care is critical because ‘[w]hether a defendant breached his
or her duty to a patient cannot be determined absent specific information about what the defendant
should have done differently.’”).
138. Roberts v. Galen of Va. Inc., 525 U.S. 250 (1999).
139. See, e.g., Jackson v. E. Bay Hosp., 246 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir. 2001).
140. Tristan Dollinger, America’s Unraveling Safety Net: EMTALA’s Effect on Emergency
Departments, Problems and Solutions, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 1759, 1762 (2015).
141. Summers v. Baptist Med. Ctr. Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132, 1137 (8th Cir. 1996).
142. See generally Elmhirst v. McLaren N. Mich., 726 F. App’x 439 (6th Cir. 2018).
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Removing the obstacle of an improper motive for vulnerable
plaintiffs and providing them with federal remedies for a grossly deficient
screening does not suddenly transform EMTALA into a horrific
federalized medical malpractice law. Rather, it protects the aging
population, further encourages effective screening, and promotes
nondiscrimination by stressing a truly “appropriate” medical screening
standard for all patients.

